Conflicting theories and mixed empirical results exist on the relationship between ethnic diversity and trust. This article argues that these mixed empirical results might be driven by contextual conditions. We conjecture that political competition could strengthen ethnic saliency and, in turn, salient ethnic identities can activate or intensify in-group trust and depress trust in members of other ethnic groups. We test this conjecture using the move towards secession in Catalonia, Spain. We conduct trust experiments across ethnic lines in Catalonia before and during the secessionist process. After three years of pro-independence mobilization in Catalonia, one of the ethnic groups, Spanish-speakers living in Catalonia, has indeed increased its in-group trust. This result is robust after a set of individual-level variables are controlled for, but no equivalent result is found in a comparable region, the Basque Country.
How do contextual political conditions affect intergroup behavior? Recent research shows that electoral campaigns and violent riots might activate different group strategies, from outgroup discrimination to accommodating the other group's goals (Beber at al. 2014; Michelich 2015) . Building on this literature, we here study some of the behavioral effects of an important but under-analyzed political process: a peaceful secessionist movement in a multiethnic society. The stakes are typically high for all ethnic groups involved in a secessionist process. The prospect of secession might increase in-group trust and cooperation among those who feel threatened by the secessionist process and probably decrease out-group trust towards members of the pro-independence ethnic majority. This is a typical result of a "security dilemma" (Posen 1993) , in which mobilization by one party can increase the insecurity of the other party and lead, in turn, to a counter-mobilization.
We focus on the recent move towards secession in Catalonia, a multi-ethnic affluent democratic society in Spain. We conduct trust experiments in Catalonia before and during the pro-independence mobilization to investigate whether this process increases in-group trust among those potentially threatened by the secession. As a further control, we conduct the same two sets of experiments in the Basque Country, a comparable multi-ethnic Spanish region undergoing no pro-independence mobilization during the period in question. Our identification strategy crucially relies on comparing two similar regions sharing a history of nationalistic mobilization at a point in time in which only one is actively mobilized towards secession. 1 We use a difference-in-difference statistical approach to test our causal claim from secessionist mobilization to intergroup discrimination. Our results largely confirm an effect of secessionist mobilization on in-group trust in Catalonia. Spanish-speakers in Catalonia, those who could feel that their interest would be threatened by the secession, trust 1 The history of national mobilizations in these two Spanish regions is summarized in the Case Study section below. See Criado et al. (2015) for a socio-economic and a behavioral comparison of Catalonia and the Basque Country.
fellow Spanish-speakers more once the secessionist movement is in place. This effect is totally absent in the case of the Basque Country.
While the effects of electoral politics and political violence on ethnic salience have been extensively studied, peaceful secessionist processes and their consequences on ethnic mobilization have been barely analyzed, despite its potential to make ethnic divisions salient.
Furthermore, the majority of analyses on the effects of political contextual variables on ethnic discrimination have focused on voting behavior or inter-ethnic violence, but not on behavioral variables such as trust. In this regard, this article aims to make a relevant contribution to the study of the behavioral effects of political mobilization by focusing on the effects of peaceful secessionist processes on intergroup trust between ethnic groups.
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Our study also provides a novel research design to study the effects of secessionism on intergroup trust in multi-ethnic societies, thus complementing other studies on the effects of contextual variables on intergroup behavior. Michelich (2015) studies the effect of elections on ethnic discrimination in Ghana, using experimental evidence at three points in time:
before, during and after the elections. Beber et al. (2014) , in turn, study the effects of proindependence riots in Sudan's capital (Khartoum) on the preferences regarding Southern Sudan's secessionist bid by Northerners who experienced those riots. These two analyses, however, do not include a similar control case in a range of relevant variables as our analysis does. Our analysis, in this sense, advances in the direction of establishing a causal link from a contextual variable (secessionist mobilization) to intergroup trust.
Theory
There is mixed evidence on intergroup discrimination on ethnic lines. Some survey studies find that ethnic heterogeneity is associated with less social trust, suggesting that people tend to trust members of their own ethnic group and distrust members of other ethnic groups (see Rice and Steele 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Costa and Kahn 2003; Delhey and Newton 2005; Ziller 2015) , or, in some cases, that both in-group and out-group trust are depressed by ethnic heterogeneity (Putnam 2007) . 3 The experimental literature, in turn, presents mixed results. Some experimental studies have found a co-ethnicity effect on trust, meaning that members of an ethnic group are both more willing to trust their co-ethnics and to distrust people from other ethnic groups (see Ferhstman and Gneezy 2001; Falk and Zehnder 2013) . Similar results are reported for participants of different ethnic backgrounds in public goods games (Habyarimana et al. 2007; . 4 By contrast, other experimental works fail to find in-group or out-group effects on trust (Boucakert and Dhaene 2004; Glaeser et al. 2000) or cooperation (Whitt and Wilson 2007; Alexander and Christia 2011) .
We argue that these mixed empirical results on intergroup discrimination could be driven by contextual political conditions to a certain extent. More specifically, political mobilization could strengthen ethnic saliency and, in turn, salient ethnic identities can activate or intensify in-group trust and depress trust in members of other ethnic groups. This view is consistent 3 However, not all analyses based on survey data agree on this point. Several analyses using data on European countries fail to find any negative impact of ethnic diversity on trust (see Hooghe et al. 2009 and Gesthuizen et al. 2009 ). Gundelach (2014) , using a measure of out-group trust as the dependent variable instead of the standard social trust question, finds that ethnic diversity actually increases such trust. Bahry et al. (2005) show that high in-group trust in ethnically heterogeneous Tartarstan and Sakha-Yakutia is normally associated with high out-group trust. According to Uslaner (2012) , it is not ethnic diversity per se but ethnic segregation that drives trust down. Trust tends to be higher in integrated communities where people have friends from different backgrounds. Rydgen et al. (2013) find fairly similar results in their analysis of two Iraqi cities: ethnic heterogeneity seems to be positively associated with trust and tolerance, at least within structurally constrained interaction spaces, even in conflict settings. 4 Non-experimental data confirming this hypothesis are reported by Miguel and Gugerty (2005) in their analysis of the provision of public goods in ethnically heterogeneous settings in Kenya.
with a constructivist approach to ethnic identities, which distinguishes between "nominal" and "activated" ethnic identities. Nominal ethnic identities are ethnic identity categories in which an individual's descent-based attributes make her eligible for membership, while activated ethnic identities are those in which she actually professes membership, or to which she is assigned by others as a member (Chandra 2012) . Therefore, every individual has a set of nominal ethnic identities, some of which can be activated, notably by political contextual variables. Some previous analyses on the effects of the political context on intergroup discrimination along ethnic lines include Michelitch (2015) on the effects of electoral campaigns on discrimination across ethnic and partisan lines, as well as some studies on the effects of conflict on intergroup trust (Cassar et al. 2013; Gilligan et al. 2014 ).
We study the effects of a peaceful secessionist process in a multi-ethnic society on intergroup trust along ethnic lines. Secessionist processes can turn violent and lead to civil wars or, in some cases, be conducted in a peaceful way. According to most evidence, in highincome countries, secessionist processes tend to be "political" rather than violent (Collier and Hoeffler 2006 ). This evidence also shows that peaceful secessionist processes are more likely in democratic countries (Walter 2009: 82) . Our case -the recent secessionist mobilization in Catalonia-fits into this pattern: an affluent region that seeks secession from a democratic state by peaceful means.
A secessionist process in a multi-ethnic society is a way of politically mobilizing ethnic identity that lies in between two extreme cases of political mobilization: a less extreme case of mobilization through regular electoral processes and a more extreme case of ethnic mobilization through violence. There is typically much more at stake than in a conventional electoral process in a peaceful secessionist process: the change in the status quo is more radical and potential gains and losses are also higher. In general terms, the potential costs of a secessionist process include state opposition (especially if the state has to deal with other potential secessionist challenges (Walter 2009 )), international hostility and economic losses (at least in a transitional period) (Bartkus 1999) . The costs for the losers in the secession process could be potentially larger than those faced by losers in a regular electoral process within the seceding community, particularly in cases of communities that are themselves ethnically heterogeneous. The minority ethnic group, that in many cases constitutes an ethnic majority in the state as a whole but a minority in the seceding region (Spanish-speakers in our case study), can feel threatened by the perspective of a newly independent state dominated by the majority ethnic group and with no protection from the former state. This ethnic minority does not typically share the desire for independence of the ethnic group that is mobilizing in favor of secession. It is for this reason that ethnic mobilization is more successful when the ethnic group seeking independence is heavily concentrated in a single region (Toft 2005; Laitin 2007: 19) and why, in general terms, ethnic differences within a region dampen its prospects of organizing successful demands for sovereignty (Sambanis and Milanovic 2011) .
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To a certain extent, a secessionist process in a multi-ethnic community implies a kind of "security dilemma" (Posen 1993) in which the minority ethnic group may feel threatened by the mobilization of the ethnic group seeking independence. This, in turn, can lead them to try to increase their security by counter-mobilization.
A secessionist process could induce effects on several variables, such as the vote, or attitudes towards secession in general. Our variable of interest is trust. There are several available definitions of trust in the literature. One of the most influential is Hardin's (2002: 4) 5 In general terms, nation-building through the mobilization of majoritarian ethno-linguistic identities implies a push towards homogenization of the national community, the imposition of a majoritarian culture and language, and, therefore, a reduction in ethno-linguistic heterogeneity (see Gellner 1983) . The building of new nations in Europe in the inter-war years provides numerous examples of ethnically heterogeneous communities forced into homogeneity through top-down nationalist policies (see Hobsbawm 1990) . Alphabetization in the majoritarian (or that of the elite) language was central to the creation of what Anderson (1983) called "imagined communities".
definition of trust as "encapsulated self interest": "I trust you because I think it is in your interest to attend to my interest in the relevant matter". According to Fehr (2008) , apart from these beliefs regarding the trustworthiness of others, trust is also based on the willingness to accept the risks involved in trusting acts. There is strong neurobiological and behavioral evidence that the preferences that underpin trust behavior are different from those towards risk in general. The risks involved in trust are typically social risks, related to social preferences such as inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) or betrayal aversion (Bohnet et al. 2008) . Notice that trust is different to a related concept, trustworthiness, which simply refers to the willingness of an individual to reciprocate trust, based basically on three types of motivations: internal commitment (out, for example, of moral inclinations), exogenous incentives (third-party sanctions, or reputational costs), or a combination of both (Hardin 2002: 28-29) . In the trust game described in the next section, the move of the first player captures trust and it is usually driven by perception of social risks, while the move of the second player could be interpreted as related to trustworthiness.
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Our argument is that the minority ethnic group in a multi-ethnic seceding community will probably feel that their interests are threatened in a relevant way. This may result in distrust towards the ethnic majority that is promoting the secessionist bid. Members of the ethnic minority may think that the members of the ethnic majority group are not "addressing their interests in the relevant matter". This may led them, first, to focus their trust on their coethnics (that is, to increase their in-group trust), as a defensive measure against a perceived threat, and, second, to decrease trust in members of the dominant ethnic group (that is, to decrease their out-group trust).
The rationale for increasing in-group trust is analogous to the aforementioned "security dilemma" sometimes encountered in analyses on ethnic collective conflict. The security dilemma is caused by security fears, one of which is when a minority ethnic group finds itself isolated within a majoritarian ethnic group (Walter 1999: 4) . These fears can fuel suspicion and distrust between members of different ethnic groups that, in turn, can lead to defensive measures to increase their own security. In less threatening scenarios, such as peaceful secessionist processes in democratic and affluent countries, members of the minority ethnic group will typically not fear for their security, but they can still fear that their interests will not be taken into account by the dominant ethnic group in the newly independent polity.
A response can be membership in the minority ethnic group (in our case, Spanish-speakers)
becoming more salient and the mobilization of the ethnic group seeking independence may be counter-balanced by a parallel mobilization by the minority ethnic group. The ethnic group can be a focal point for the collective action (Hardin 1995; de Vaal 2005) . In this scenario, ingroup trust will likely grow. It is also likely that distrust against the out-group will grow too, to the extent that members of the minority group will not think that their interests will be encapsulated into the majority ethnic group's interests.
Based on the theoretical discussion and taking into account our empirical strategy, we can set out our hypotheses in precise terms:
1. Participants will not trust their co-ethnics more in the endline study than in the baseline study in the non-treated region (the Basque Country). 2. Participants will not trust non co-ethnics less in the endline study than in the baseline study in the non-treated region (the Basque Country).
7 In what follows we refer to this first wave of experiments as the baseline study and to the second wave of experiments -conducted in early 2015-as the endline study.
3. Spanish-speakers will trust their co-ethnics more in the endline study than in the baseline study in the treated region (Catalonia).
4. Spanish-speakers will trust non co-ethnics less in the endline study than in the baseline study in the treated region (Catalonia).
Research Design
Case study selected -Catalonia This move towards secession has clearly made ethnic identities more salient. Proindependence forces have stressed the existence of a Catalan ethnic and cultural identity different from the Spanish one. This may have deepened the existing cleavage in Catalan society between the Spanish and Catalan identities. 8 As mentioned in the theoretical part of this paper, there is ample empirical evidence that electoral processes can mobilize ethnic identities, but hardly any on the consequences of secessionist processes for social behavior.
In this type of political process, the stakes are higher than in a standard election campaign, and, as a consequence, the effect on social dynamics such as trust could be also greater. This 
Behavioral experiments
We conducted online experiments in Catalonia and the Basque Country in 2012 and 2015.
The baseline studies were conducted in February and March 2012 in the Basque Country and in April and May 2012 in Catalonia. The endline studies were conducted in January 2015.
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The participants were 936 students and non-students (388 men and 548 women) recruited on seven university campuses (four in the Basque Country and three in Catalonia). Subjects 12 These two points in time coincide with initial and advanced phases of the current mobilization towards session in Catalonia.
participated in the experiment online. All the studies used a purposely-designed online platform. Participants played only one instance of a trust game anonymously.
The experiment involved a symmetric version of the trust game 13 (Berg et al. 1995) that included both in-group (same ethnic group) and out-group (different ethnic group) dyads.
Each participant played the game only once with a single anonymous partner. The players in a dyad were each provided with an endowment of €50. After receiving the endowment, the first mover (sender) in a dyad transferred an amount between zero and €50. The experimenter doubled this transfer. After learning how much had been transferred, the second mover (receiver) transferred an amount between zero and €50 back to the first mover. The experimenter also doubled the back-transfer. We use a symmetric version of the trust game in which the receiver is asked to reveal her decision regardless of the sender's decision. We chose the symmetric version because it maximizes the number of observations from receivers. In the original trust game, the receiver only gets to decide when the sender sends a positive amount.
The experiment had a 2x2x4 factorial design resulting from the combination of two years, two regions and four pairing conditions (see Table 1 ). Once the participants had confirmed their participation in the experiment, they received general instructions and were asked to answer a pre-experiment questionnaire which included questions on age, sex, nationality and language. Once they had answered it, they were presented with the instructions of the trust game and asked to answer control questions. The instructions of the game were presented and the control questions answered before participants were informed 13 The investment or trust game has been extensively studied using laboratory, field and online experiments. Johnson and Mislin (2011) provide a meta-analysis of over one hundred and sixty experimental replications of this game in different geographical locations. On average, they find a considerable willingness to trust and reciprocate trust behaviour across subject pools. However, they also find important behavioural differences between replications of the experiment. Most of these differences can be explained by various design features of the experiments, but they also find robust evidence of geographical differences.
about their role in the game. Once participants understood the rules of the game, they were informed of the language of the person they were interacting with and asked to make their choice. Each participant was shown on the screen the answer her partner gave to the question "which is the language you use in your daily live?" Before answering the socio-demographic questionnaire, they were informed that the only thing they will know about their partner will be the answer to one question from the questionnaire. If they played as receivers, they were also informed of how much money the sender had sent. Finally, participants were asked to answer a post-experiment questionnaire. When participants completed the second questionnaire, they were given a participation code and a password to collect a prize if they were selected to be paid. Twenty participants, ten in the Basque Country and ten in Catalonia,
were actually paid their earnings in the experiment. The maximum payment was €130, the minimum €16 and the average €66.98. ( 1) where is participant i's amount sent in the trust game; takes the value 1 if was in Catalonia and 0 if was in the Basque Country; if the decision was made in the second year (endline), 0 if the decision was made in the first year (baseline); to are the coefficients to be estimated; is the error term. In this specification, the effect of participating in the experiment in Catalonia in the second year is a difference-in-difference.
Specifically, it is the difference in the change over time in the amount sent (trust) between Catalonia and the Basque Country, i.e., it is . We estimate below this model separately for each of the four ethnic dyads presented in table 1. We also pool the data and estimate the four dyads jointly with and without additional control variables.
Results

Trust and Ethnicity: Differences-in-Differences
We begin by examining the average trust levels found in the experiment in Catalonia and the Basque Country, in the baseline and endline studies (figure 2). In Catalonia there is a small, insignificant increase in trust levels of two percentage points. In the Basque Country average trust in the endline is observed to be seven percentage points lower than in the baseline experiment. This decline in trust is statistically significant at the 10% level. However, the trends in the Basque Country and Catalonia are only marginally different. The p-value of the differences-in-differences estimator (Cat x Y2) is p=0.104. 14 In fact, we show below that the increase in trust levels in Catalonia is driven by one of the dyads in the experiment: SpanishSpanish. When that dyad is excluded from the analysis declining trust levels are also observed in Catalonia in the endline. The top two graphs show trust levels in Spanish (left) and NonSpanish (right) coethnic dyads.
The bottom two graphs present results of noncoethnic dyads. We plot average trust for each region and year for each graph. Finally, we report statistical tests in horizontal bars. The significance levels reported correspond to the regression specification reported in Table 2 below.
FIGURE 2. Average Trust in the Basque Country and Catalonia in the Baseline and Endline studies
Note: Average trust levels (as a % of initial endowments) are graphed as vertical bars. The whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. The difference in means between the years (lower horizontal bars) is tested and reported for each region in each time period. The upper horizontal bar indicates the level of significance of the difference-in-differences between the Basque Country and Catalonia. * P<0.1.
Our first observation is that there is a decline in trust levels between the baseline and the endline in seven of the eight time comparisons. This suggests that we would observe a similar negative trend in trust in the two regions without our language treatment. Second, average trust behavior among NonSpanish participants in Catalonia (Catalan speakers) does not change between the two studies. The third observation is that there is virtually no difference in any of the pairings between the two years in the Basque Country, as we predicted. Finally, we observe a large, significant change in the behavior of the SpanishSpanish dyad in Catalonia. This group goes from being the less trusting dyad in Catalonia in the baseline to be the more trusting. Trust between Spanish speakers in Catalonia increases from 34% in the baseline study to 53% in the endline. This increase in trust is significant at the 1% level and the difference-in-difference estimator (Cat x Y2) is significant at the 5% level for this group (see Table 2 ). 15 This suggests that the Spanish-Spanish group is the only group affected by the pro-independence mobilization in Catalonia between the baseline and endline studies. We come back to this result below, but first we replicate our differences-indifferences analysis incorporating a set of control variables that may affect the decision to trust.
FIGURE 3. Average trust by language pairing
Note: Average trust levels (as a % of initial endowments) are graphed as vertical bars. The whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. The difference in means between the years (lower horizontal bars) is tested and reported for each region in each time period. The upper horizontal bar indicates the level of significance of the difference in differences between the Basque Country and Catalonia. ***P<0.01; ** P<0.05; * P<0.1. 
Trust and Ethnicity: Differences-in-Differences with Controls
One limitation of our two-period experimental study is that it has no panel structure and we cannot estimate changes at the individual level. This poses a problem if the four samples in the experiment (two regions and two years) differ in any variable correlated with trust behavior and that correlation drives our main result presented above. We addressed this issue prior to the experiments by focusing on largely homogeneous samples of participants recruited on several university campuses. 16 However, some variation can still be observed in variables that have been shown to correlate with trust behavior in the experiment. Table 3 reports the means and standard deviations of five covariates for which there is enough variation in our sample. There is a higher proportion of women than men and participants are on average relatively young (the median is 23) in all our experiments. However, no significant change is observed in the proportion of women or the average age of the participants between the two regions and years, as shown in the last column of Table 3 . The samples in our experiment consist of both students and non-students and it has been reported that these two groups behave differently in experimental trust games (Belot et al., 2015) . A higher proportion of students can be observed in all the samples except in the endline study in the Basque Country. Finally, we use two variables to control for idiosyncratic characteristics of participants: first, we use a standard survey question on risk attitudes to control for lower willingness to trust among risk lovers. Second, we control for a self-reported measure of identification with Catalan (Basque) nationalist causes. There is no change in the average risk attitudes of participants, but the Catalan sample in the endline is marginally less supportive of the Catalan nationalist cause.
TABLE 3. Mean of covariates
2 0 1 2 2 0 1 5 B a s q u e C o u n t r y C a t a l o n i a B a s q u e C o u n t r y C a t a l o n i a D i f f e r e n c e s i n differences Female ( Standard deviations are in parentheses in the first 4 columns. Standard errors are in parentheses in the difference-in-differences column, which compares means in Catalonia before and after the political mobilization to means in the Basque Country. Standard errors come from regressing the characteristics on year and region trends and an interaction term using an OLS. *** P<0.001;** P<0.05, *P<0.1.
The first model in Table 4 reports a regression analysis pooling the four models reported in Table 2 The second and third models reported in Table 4 add objective and subjective controls to our pooling analysis, respectively. Our main result is robust to the introduction of these two sets of controls. More specifically, the coefficient capturing the specific time trend of the Spanish coethnic dyad in Catalonia hardly changes between models. Additionally, we find two results that are in line with previous experimental studies on the trust game: older and risk-prone participants trust more. We report no specific coethnic behavior in trust before the pro-independence mobilization in
Catalonia and similarly we find no change between the baseline and endline studies in any of the dyads in the Basque Country. By contrast, Spanish speakers in Catalonia show a significantly higher level of trust towards other Spanish speakers after the political mobilization. Interestingly, we observe no behavioral change in the target group of the political mobilization: Catalan speakers. Moreover, these results are robust to the introduction of a series of control variables that have been shown to affect trust behavior.
The results, therefore, point to an effect of secessionist mobilization on in-group trust in the ethnic group (Spanish-speakers) that did not mobilize for independence, while there is no a similar effect on the non-treated region, the Basque Country. This confirms three of the theoretical hypothesis. A fourth one, claiming a decrease in out-group trust towards nonSpanish speakers in Catalonia, is largely disconfirmed. It seems that the response of the ethnic community potentially more threatened by independence is a defensive one: an increase in trust towards members of their own community, but not a decrease in the (already relatively low) levels of out-group trust.
Reciprocity and Ethnicity: Differences-in-Differences
We have so far focused on the effect of mobilization in Catalonia on trust. In addition to trust, our experiment observes the behavior of receivers in the trust game, which is typically interpreted as a measure of reciprocity. Second movers typically return positive amounts in the trust game (Johnson and Mislin, 2011) and, in the case of reciprocal behavior, the amount returned is positively correlated with the amount received. Potentially, mobilization towards secession could also have an effect on reciprocity. 17 To model changes in reciprocal behavior, we estimate the following linear regression model:
where is participant j's amount sent back to participant i in the trust game; is the amount received by participant j from participant i; takes the value 1 if was in Catalonia and 0 if was in the Basque Country; if the decision was made in the second year (endline), 0 if the decision was made in the first year (baseline); to are the coefficients to be estimated; is the error term. In this specification, the effect of the change in reciprocal behavior for individuals participating in the experiment in Catalonia is a triple difference. Specifically, it is the difference in the change over time in the correlation between the amount received and the amount sent back between Catalonia and the Basque Country, i.e., it is . We estimate below this model separately for each of the four ethnic dyads 17 In fact, second movers' behavior in the trust game can be interpreted as a measure of social preferences because they are independent of risk aversion, as an anonymous referee pointed out. However, the focus of our paper is trust behavior, which involves a different type of risk (social risk) as discussed in the theory section. S p a n i s h -S p a n i s h N o n S p a n i s hNonSpanish We find no significant change on reciprocal behavior for any of the ethnic dyads. This means that, whereas mobilization towards session has a significant effect on trust (beliefs about other individual), it has no effect on reciprocity (preferences about another individual).
Conclusions
In this paper, we claim that the mobilization of ethnicity through secessionism has an impact on the in-group trust of the ethnic group potentially threatened by the secessionist bid. Most studies have stressed two main ways of mobilizing ethnicity: through elections and through violent conflict. These studies, with some exceptions, have focused on the effects of regular elections and conflict on voting or public opinion attitudes across ethnic lines. We here test the effects of another, middle way of mobilizing ethnicity -peaceful secessionist processes in multi-ethnic societies-on trust across ethnic lines. We specifically sought to establish whether a period of intense secessionist mobilization has had an effect on in-group and outgroup trust for the would-be losers of a successful secessionist bid: the ethnic group of Spanish-speakers that were mostly not the target of the secessionist mobilization. As far as we know, this is the first analysis of the effects of a peaceful secessionist process on a behavioral variable like trust.
Having conducted experiments on trust across ethnic lines in Catalonia before the mobilization towards secession began, we realized when the process gained momentum that this gave us the opportunity to test whether this type of mobilization has the potential to affect in-group trust by running another wave of experiments on trust. We have also benefited from a further control in another multi-ethnic society with no secessionist mobilization in the period under consideration, the Basque Country. So to a certain extent we find ourselves faced with a sort of natural experiment on mobilization and trust.
The results largely confirm that secessionist mobilization in a multi-ethnic society has had indeed an effect on trust across ethnic lines. After two years of pro-independence mobilization in Catalonia, one of the ethnic groups -, Spanish-speakers living in Cataloniahas indeed increased its in-group trust. This result is robust after controlling for a set of individual-level variables, but no equivalent result is found in the Basque Country. This finding is in line with recent studies that have found that traumatic forms of mobilization (conflict) have an impact on trust. The Catalan secessionist process is a peaceful one, but the stakes are nonetheless higher for winners and losers than in a regular election and, probably for this reason, an effect on in-group trust can be seen for one of the ethnic groups living in Catalonia. The fact that this effect is limited to Spanish-speakers is also relevant. This is a large minority in Catalonia that generally does not share the secessionist preferences of the Catalan-speakers. Arguably, Spanish-speakers are the group that potentially can harbor more fears that their relevant interest will not be taken into account in a newly independent state.
Interestingly, this did not led them to trust less in Catalan-speakers, but rather increased their in-group trust, perhaps as a defensive reaction towards the mobilizations for independence by the majority ethnic group in Catalonia. This result has interesting implications for other peaceful secessionist processes in multi-ethnic communities, as the mobilization of the secessionist issue by the majority ethnic group within the seceding community can have the unforeseen result of generating defensive attitudes on the part of the ethnic group that in principle can feel itself threatened by the secessionist bid.
We find no effect of the secessionist move on reciprocal behavior between the different ethnic groups. This suggests that the effect should be interpreted as a change in beliefs -of Spanish speakers in Catalonia-and not as a change in preferences about other social groups.
The result also points to the fact that ethnic heterogeneity per se does not necessarily have behavioral consequences in variables such as trust, explaining to a certain extent the apparently contradictory results obtained in the empirical analyses on ethnic heterogeneity and trust. The literature has already pointed to contextual variables as spatial segregation, electoral mobilization in regular elections and conflict that can affect in-group and out-group trust. We have shown in this paper that another type of contextual variable, a peaceful secessionist process, can indeed affect in-group trust.
Through further research, we need to establish whether our results are limited in scope to ethnic groups that are a national majority but a regional minority or, more generally, to situations in which there is a clear minority.
